In Clancy v. Farid, 2018 ONSC 7482: [56]The doctrine of absolute privilege is well-settled and stands for the proposition that “no action lies, whether against judges, counsel, jury, witnesses or parties, for words spoken, documents prepared and actions taken in the ordinary course of any proceedings, before any court or judicial tribunal recognized by law; the privilege extends to documents properly used and regularly prepared for use in the proceedings.” The privilege is not confined to statements made in court, but extends to all preparatory steps taken with a view to judicial proceedings. It is the occasion not the communication that is privileged. The immunity is not limited to actions for defamation: Salasel v. Cuthbertson, 2015 ONCA 115 (CanLII); at paras. 35-36. In Amato v. Welsh, 2013 ONCA 258 Cronk J.A. writes: [35] The doctrine has its roots in the early development of the law of defamation. However, in its modern form, its reach is considerably broader. Relying on Hargreaves v. Bretherton and Another, [1958] 3 All E.R. 122 (Q.B.D.), at 123, Feldman J.A. for this court in Samuel Manu-Tech confirmed, at para. 20, that: “[t]he immunity extends to any action, however framed, and is not limited to actions for defamation.” See also Lowe, at para. 58. The often-quoted definition of absolute privilege as cited in Raymond E. Brown The Law of Defamation in Canada, such as this extract from Dechant v. Stevens 2001 ABCA 39: Absolute privilege has been conceded on obvious grounds of public policy to insure It is essential to the ends of justice that all persons participating in judicial proceedings should enjoy in the discharge of their public duties or , without fear of consequences. The purpose of the law is, not to protect malice and malevolence, but the discharge of a public function, …

The term “abuse of the process of the court” is a term of great significance. It connotes that the process of the court must be carried out properly, honestly and in good faith; and it means that the court will not allow its function as a court of law to be misused but will in a proper case, prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation or oppression in the process of litigation. (Bullen, Leake & Jacob’s, Precedents of Pleadings, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1975) at pages 148 to 149) In Carbone v. DeGroote, 2018 ONSC 109, at para. 43: “Circumventing a court order or circumventing the operation of a Rule by initiating a further proceeding has been determined to be an abuse of process. … The doctrine of abuse of process seeks to promote judicial economy and to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings”; The doctrine can be used to prevent the relitigation of an issue in circumstances in which the requirements for issue estoppel are not met (C.U.P.E. at paras. 42-43; Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 227, at para. 41); In R. v. Scott, 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC) McLachlin J. stated: … abuse of process may be established where: (1) the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious; and, (2) violate the fundamental principles of justice underlying the community’s sense of fair play and decency. The concepts of oppressiveness and vexatiousness underline the interest of the accused in a fair trial. But the doctrine evokes as well the public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice; and In Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63,at para 37: In the context that interests us here, the doctrine of abuse of process engages “the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would . . . bring the administration of justice into disrepute” ... One circumstance in which abuse of process has been applied is where the litigation before the court is found to be in essence an attempt to relitigate a claim which the court has already determined. [Emphasis added.]

In Ontario, a litigant may obtain an equitable remedy at the court's discretion if the party seeking the equitable remedy has come to court with clean hands. In Toronto (City) v Polai,[1969] OJ. No 1624 (CA), at para. 46 the Ontario Court of Appeal provided some insight into the origins and purpose of the doctrine: "The maxim 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands' which has been invoked mostly in cases between private litigants, requires a plaintiff seeking equitable relief to show that his past record in the transaction is clean: Overton v. Banister (1844), 3 Hare 503, 67 E.R. 479; Nail v. Punter (1832), 5 Sim. 555, 58 E.R. 447; Re Lush's Trust (1869), L.R. 4 Ch. App. 591. These cases present instances of the Court's refusal to grant relief to the plaintiff because of his wrongful conduct in the very matter which was the subject of the suit in equity."

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S. 137.1(2) of the CJA defines “expression” as any communication, regardless of whether it is made verbally or non-verbally, whether it is made publicly or privately, and whether or not it is directed at a person or entity.

In 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, paragraphs 58 to 66 the COA provides clear criteria on what constitutes public interest: [59] There is no exhaustive list of topics that fall under the rubric “public interest”. Some topics are inevitably matters of public interest. The conduct of governmental affairs and the operation of the courts come to mind. Other topics may or may not raise matters of public interest, depending on the specific circumstances: Grant v. Torstar Corp., at paras. 103-106. [63] Public interest does not turn on the size of the audience. Especially in today's world, communications on private matters can find very large audiences quickly. On the other hand, statements between two people can relate to matters that have a strong public interest component. In Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 [103] The authorities offer no single “test” for public interest, nor a static list of topics falling within the public interest (see, e.g., Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed. 2008), at p. 530). Guidance, however, may be found in the cases on fair comment and s. 2(b) of the Charter. [104] In London Artists, Ltd. v. Littler, [1969] 2 All E.R. 193 (C.A.), speaking of the defence of fair comment, Lord Denning, M.R., described public interest broadly in terms of matters that may legitimately concern or interest people: There is no definition in the books as to what is a matter of public interest. All we are given is a list of examples, coupled with the statement that it is for the judge and not for the jury. I would not myself confine it within narrow limits. Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or to others; then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment. [p. 198] [105] To be of public interest, the subject matter “must be shown to be one inviting public attention, or about which the public has some substantial concern because it affects the welfare of citizens, or one to which considerable public notoriety or controversy has attached”: Brown, vol. 2, at pp. 15-137 and 15-138. The case law on fair comment “is replete with successful fair comment defences on matters ranging from politics to restaurant and book reviews”: Simpson v. Mair, 2004 BCSC 754, 31 B.C.L.R. (4th) 285, at para. 63, per Koenigsberg J. Public interest may be a function of the prominence of the person referred to in the communication, but mere curiosity or prurient interest is not enough. Some segment of the public must have a genuine stake in knowing about the matter published. [106] Public interest is not confined to publications on government and political matters, as it is in Australia and New Zealand. Nor is it necessary that the plaintiff be a “public figure”, as in the American jurisprudence since Sullivan. Both qualifications cast the public interest too narrowly. The public has a genuine stake in knowing about many matters, ranging from science and the arts to the environment, religion and morality. The democratic interest in such wide-ranging public debate must be reflected in the jurisprudence.

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is a lawsuit brought by persons subject to public criticism to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition. ​ The Anti-SLAPP Advisory Reports described the potential effect is that: SLAPPs can intimidate opponents, deplete their resources, reduce their ability to participate in public affairs, and deter others from participating in discussion on matters of public interest. In 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2018 ONCA 685, 2018, Doherty J.A. Wrote [1] Freedom of expression is a constitutionally-protected right in Canada. The free and open expression of divergent, competing, and strong viewpoints on matters of public interest is essential to personal liberty, self-fulfillment, the search for the truth, and the maintenance of a vibrant democracy. [2] From time to time, those who are the target of criticism resort to litigation, not to vindicate any genuine wrong done to them, but to silence, intimidate, and punish those who have spoken out. Litigation can be a potent weapon in the hands of the rich and powerful. The financial and personal costs associated with defending a lawsuit, particularly one brought by a deep-pocketed plaintiff determined to maximize the costs incurred in defending the litigation, can deter even the most committed and outspoken critic. [3] Lawsuits brought to silence and/or financially punish one's critics have come to be known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("SLAPP"). Defamation lawsuits, perhaps because of the relatively light burden the case law places on the plaintiff, have proved to be an ideal vehicle for SLAPPs. ​[65] In summary, the concept of “public interest” as it is used in s. 137.1(3) is a broad one that does not take into account the merits or manner of the expression, nor the motive of the author. The determination of whether an expression relates to a matter of public interest must be made objectively, having regard to the context in which the expression was made and the entirety of the relevant communication. An expression may relate to more than one matter. If one of those matters is a “matter of public interest”, the defendant will have met its onus under s. 137.1(3).

The purpose of the anti-SLAPP provisions is: (a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest; (b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest; (c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and (d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action.